INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, there has been a drive to reduce complicated concepts into simple numbers. Corruption, rule of law, human rights, and more, have all been reduced to quantitative "indicators." Based on the theory that what gets measured gets done, government agencies have incorporated quantitative indicators into performance-based rules, information disclosure regimes, and self-2013] REGULATING THROUGH NUMBERS 577 regulation. 1 International law has recently begun using these statistical tools to operationalize global norms and thereby improve compliance. As a second-order abstraction of statistical information, indicators rely on numbers to represent social phenomena and evaluate performance. Backed by technical expertise and designed to produce comparability, these tools are shaping decision making by domestic and global regulatory bodies. For instance, the World Bank's Doing Business indicators produce a ranking of developing countries based on the quality of their business laws and legal institutions. 2 The Bank's classification then influences its allocation of foreign aid as well as that of the U.S. government through the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 3 Domestic law has also incorporated indicators, as in the 2008 reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 4 This law relies on performance indicators to assess foreign governments' compliance with minimum anti-trafficking standards and then categorize countries into three tiers. 5 Given their propensity to simplify complex concepts and translate them into quantifiable measures, indicators are often used to regulate more intangible, value-laden issues such as the rule of law (as in the Freedom House indicators), corruption (as in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index), and human rights (as in the indicators developed by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor treaty compliance). 6 Indicators are playing an increasingly important role in regulatory governance. 7 If used effectively, they can offer a number of apparent benefits: they can measure accountability to standards and norms; assess compliance with policies and specific targets; and evaluate performance with respect to stated objectives. They can also facilitate an efficient processing of information and reduce the costs and resources devoted to decision making. The appeal of indicators lies in their ability to translate phenomena, such as respect for the rule of law, into a numerical representation that is easy to understand and compare across actors. Moreover, their simplicity enables more effective communication with those who are governed as well as the general public, thereby promoting ideals of transparency and accountability (at least in theory). Yet legal scholarship has been largely silent about the implications of indicators for governance. While scholars have recognized the benefits of new governance mechanisms, 8 they have neglected to consider the limitations when these statistical tools are applied in practice. I contend that indicators are being embraced too wholeheartedly without sufficient attention to their costs.
In this Article, I analyze the prevalence of quantitative indicators as an emerging regulatory tool in domestic and global governance, identify the potential costs of using these tools to inform decision making, and offer recommendations on how to limit their costs and enhance their benefits. My primary aim is not to reject the use of indicators in governance. Rather, I propose ways in which government agencies and private actors can more effectively use these tools in regulation to meaningfully compare units of analysis and evaluate performance. I argue that indicators can serve as effective tools provided that they measure what is relevant to stakeholders, are designed by a broad group of experts and citizens, and are backed by reliable data. This Article contributes to scholarly debates on the effectiveness of new governance mechanisms in regulation as well as the legitimacy of private regulatory bodies, which have become key players in international governance. 9 8. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L. J. 1490, 1534 (2006) ("Institutions involved in international decisionmaking should be required to develop indicators and metrics that track issues of concern, and to collect data on a basis that is comparable across jurisdictions. A data-driven policy evaluation structure that gauges institutional performance can trigger competitive pressures and support a more empirical approach to decisionmaking, thereby contributing to policymaking effectiveness."). 
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Indicators address a visceral desire of policymakers to find mechanisms that can increase compliance with rules, a problem particularly acute in international law. Given its lack of coercive force, international law must rely on other means to affect state and non-state behavior. Scholars have studied the role of reputation, reciprocity, and acculturation, among other factors, in enhancing international law's ability to shape policy and decision making. 10 An emerging but as yet under-studied mechanism is the power of numbers.
Private regulatory bodies have emerged as significant players in the production and enforcement of international law. 11 However, the legitimacy of private actors is questionable given their lack of public accountability, an absence of oversight mechanisms, and possible manipulation by special interests. 12 Private regulatory bodies have recently turned to indicators to claim scientific authority, affirm legal values such as transparency and predictability, and assert their legitimacy to govern. Yet when indicators translate legal norms into quantifiable metrics, there are unintended consequences.
My analysis of indicators is based on an empirical study of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a private regulatory body that has produced the leading standard for corporate sustainability reporting. The GRI guidelines include seventy-nine indicators on which corporations self-report on their social, environmental, and economic performance and are then assigned a score of A, B, or C. 13 According to a 2008 study by the accounting firm KPMG, more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune 250 companies use GRI guidelines as the basis for their reporting. 14 recently mandated sustainability disclosure by companies (some of which rely on GRI guidelines), while many others are actively considering such a regime and have already adopted voluntary sustainability reporting standards. 15 In addition, mainstream institutional investors, not just socially responsible ones, are increasingly considering sustainability performance in their investment decisions and thus consulting GRI reports.
As the case of the GRI illustrates, indicators facilitate the process by which legal norms are interpreted and implemented, particularly in areas of international law where norms may be ill defined and traditional enforcement mechanisms are absent. For instance, the GRI indicators aim to make corporate sustainability reporting more mainstream as part of a larger goal of achieving corporate accountability. In this way, they are operationalizing emerging norms on corporate responsibility for human rights, among other issues. Soft law instruments such as the U.N. Global Compact lack independent monitoring and enforcement and have been criticized for being conceptually vague and difficult to implement. 16 While advocates have turned to U.S. litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited its exterritorial application. 17 The GRI is an example of an alternative approach -information regulation through numbers -for changing corporate behavior. 18 It represents a shift in governance towards data-based tools such as quantitative indicators to enhance compliance with legal norms.
Yet my study of the GRI demonstrates that the use of quantitative indicators can be fraught with problems, which are often overlooked due 15 
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to the authoritative quality of numbers. For instance, one potential cost of indicators is the promotion of box ticking and superficial compliance, as evident in the GRI's system of grading reports. Companies that issue GRI reports receive a grade of A, B, or C based on the quantity of indicators that they report on, rather than the quality of their performance. 19 In addition, because third-party verification is optional, NGOs do not trust the data behind the indicators. We therefore see that the motivation behind the GRI is not whether the reports are credible to NGOs or whether they reflect a company's good or bad performance, but that more and more companies participate which perpetuates the existence of the GRI and raises its status as the leading standard for corporate sustainability reporting. In this way, the GRI has strayed from its original audience of consumers and NGOs, and its initial aim of corporate accountability. The use of indicators as ends, in and of themselves, has threatened the perceived legitimacy of the organization that produces and relies on them. My analysis of the GRI applies an anthropological approach as I look inside the black box of indicators and analyze the various stages in which they are implicated in governance, including their production, implementation, and impact. Towards that end, I have conducted interviews with the producers of the indicators (members of the GRI's secretariat in Amsterdam and its New York City office), users (company officials that use GRI guidelines in their sustainability reports), consumers (investors and NGOs who read GRI reports), and U.S. government representatives (SEC officials who are considering whether to mandate disclosure on environmental and social issues as part of securities filings). In addition, I have participated in a GRI-certified training program in order to look behind the numbers and understand how GRI reports are made and evaluated. This Article will proceed as follows. Part I analyzes the prevalence of indicators as a tool of domestic and international governance and then explores the broader historical and sociological context that explains their emergence in policymaking. Part II describes the development of the GRI as the leading standard for corporate sustainability reporting and its impact on regulation and financial markets. Part III draws upon the case study to outline the potential costs of using indicators, including the promotion of superficial compliance, the dominance of technical experts over decision making, and the distortion of public values when converted to numbers. Finally, Part IV offers recommendations on how to enhance the promise and minimize the perils of using indicators. In order to maximize their effectiveness, I propose that government agencies and private actors 
I. INDICATORS AS A TOOL OF REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
A regulatory tool that has become increasingly prevalent in domestic and international governance is the indicator, defined as follows:
An indicator is a named, rank-ordered representation of past or projected performance by different units that uses numerical data to simplify a more complex social phenomenon, drawing on scientific expertise and methodology. The representation is capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as countries or persons), and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more standards. 20 Comprising such aggregators as indices, rankings, and composites, indicators serve as second-order abstractions of statistical information and are used to evaluate performance according to a standard. 21 Indicators attempt to imbue a technocratic rationality into decision making and, by doing so, render domains (however complex, such as health or criminality) calculable and susceptible to evaluation and intervention. A guise of neutrality and objectivity exists behind these tools and masks underlying power relations. Their effectiveness depends on experts with specialized skills and esoteric knowledge -"[e]xperts hold out the hope that problems of regulation can remove themselves from the disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet seductive territory of truth." 22 Given their ability to translate phenomena into a numerical representation that is transparent, easy to understand, and comparable across actors, indicators are increasingly incorporated in domestic regulation and international law.
A. The Prevalence of Indicators in Domestic Regulation
Domestic agencies frequently incorporate indicators into "new governance" mechanisms, which comprise alternative regulatory strategies that impact the behavior of business and other organizations. 23 regimes, voluntary programs, and self-regulation, all of which offer regulated entities more flexibility than traditional regimes. 24 New governance mechanisms stand in contrast to command and control methods that rely on specific, inflexible mandates to change behavior. These methods are not mutually exclusive, for instance a voluntary program could feature a performance-based standard or a self-regulatory regime could be based on information disclosure rules.
Rather than specifying a certain behavior, performance-based regulation sets measurable outcomes and often entails the application of performance indicators. It provides regulated entities with the flexibility to develop innovative, cost-effective methods to achieve a performance standard. 25 28 This federal legislation requires schools to achieve specified academic results as measured by a variety of indicators -for example, the percentage of students who are at or above the proficient levels in reading and math; the percentage of classes being taught by "highly qualified" teachers; and the percentage of students who drop out of school. 29 Another example is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Reactor Oversight Process, which relies on a series of performance indicators to monitor the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors. 30 Like performance-based regulation, informational regulation does not mandate specific behavioral change; it instead requires actors to collect and disclose information which is often based on indicators. 31 35 This initiative provided regulatory and administrative benefits (e.g., reduced inspections) to firms that achieved superior levels of environmental performance. 36 It also worked with participating firms to improve performance based on a variety of environmental indicators, including water use, greenhouse gas emissions, and hazardous waste generation. 37 Industry groups, non-governmental organizations, and standards-setting bodies administer and enforce initiatives of self-regulation, which depend on the cooperation of firms for their compliance. 38 While these efforts are sometimes largely symbolic and an attempt to avert more stringent government action, 39 
B. Indicators in International Law
The innovative regulatory practices described above are beginning to appear in the international system, thus creating a model of "transnational new governance." 43 Indicators are increasingly becoming a prominent feature in global governance, as they operationalize legal principles and provide a mechanism to measure compliance (frequently as part of a ranking of states or firms 49 Finally, private standard-setting organizations are relying on indicators to interpret and implement global norms while also facilitating their transition into domestic regulation. For instance, the GRI has developed guidelines, including a set of seventy-nine indicators, to implement global norms on corporate sustainability reporting. 50 As a non-state actor, the GRI cannot enforce compliance by requiring all companies to report on their performance using its indicators. But it has influenced governments and stock exchanges to model their standards for sustainability reporting on its guidelines. 51 
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REGULATING THROUGH NUMBERS 587 domestic law but are also themselves adopted as part of mandatory and voluntary standards. Transnational governance regimes frequently address collective action problems (e.g., climate change) and coordination problems (e.g., harmonizing accounting standards) as they draw upon specialized expertise. 52 Private bodies, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Accounting Standards Board, and the Fair Labor Association, bypass government involvement and independently set standards on safety, accounting, and labor rights for developing countries. 53 While private bodies may replace direct governmental regulation or regulate areas not subject to governmental oversight, they raise important legitimacy concerns given their lack of public accountability. 54 On the legitimacy of supranational bodies, Daniel Esty observes: "When a matter is largely scientific or technical, having designated supranational experts address the problem may be uncontroversial. As an issue becomes more political or normatively charged, however, delegation to those lacking electoral legitimacy becomes increasingly problematic." 55 Data exchange or policy benchmarking are examples of activities with a scientific or technical focus that could "establish the legitimacy of policymaking." 56 This is where indicators come in.
Indicators are an important tool for private transnational institutions that are vulnerable to criticisms of accountability and legitimacy. They provide private actors with an easily accessible tool that allows them to efficiently process information, attract public attention, and govern the conduct of others. While non-state actors lack enforcement power, they appeal to indicators to provide them with scientific authority and the leverage to pressure actors to comply with their standards. By relying on indicators, they can exert their power indirectly by "taking what is essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science." 57 As a result, their credibility is increased and their power is less subject to contestation. 
C. The Sociological and Historical Factors Behind the Power of Numbers
In order to command scientific authority, indicators rely on numbers, as they serve as second-order abstractions of complex phenomena. Numbers construct new categories and new relations among people and things through standardization and commensurability and, in the process, "profoundly transform what we choose to do, who we try to be, and what we think of ourselves." 58 Commensuration fosters detachment by objectifying subjective values, standardizing relations between often disparate characteristics, and enabling a depersonalization that is critical for bureaucratic and economic rationality. 59 This process "changes the terms of what can be talked about, how we value, and how we treat what we value." 60 Commensuration (through such tools as indicators) is a means of managing uncertainty, depersonalizing relations, imposing control, securing legitimacy, and enforcing discipline. 61 Numbers serve as a "technology of distance," 62 whose authority comes from "their capacity to create and overcome distance, both physical and social." 63 They abstract away the individual and the local while also creating a universal language that transcends distance. 64 In this way, objectivity through numbers becomes a proxy for truth and fairness. In her study of human rights indicators, Sally Engle Merry contends that indicators "convey an aura of objective truth and facilitate comparisons. However, indicators typically conceal their political and theoretical origins and underlying theories of social change and activism." 65 Merry further notes that "[a] key dimension of the power of indicators [and other technologies of audit] is their capacity to convert complicated, contextually variable phenomena into unambiguous, clear, and impersonal measures." 66 Numbers display governmentality because they serve as a technology of power that constitutes populations and makes individuals calculable and therefore governable -both by others and themselves. They create "a promise of control" through the administration of everyday life -for instance, they 58. IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 3 (1990 reassure citizens "against the uncertainties of poverty, crime, unemployment, and more recently environmental and technological risk." 67 Why have officials and the public at large come to appreciate and even demand numbers to solve problems, make decisions, and exert control? Quantification methods have achieved considerable prestige and power in the modern world. 68 We see the prevalence of cost-benefit analysis in U.S. government bureaucracies since the early-twentieth century as well as within economics since the mid-twentieth century. State bureaucrats introduced cost-benefit methods and other accounting technologies to achieve uniformity and public trust, and to dispel the notion that their decisions were arbitrary and biased given that they lacked the mandate of a popular election. 69 The notion of statistics as the science of the state suggests how the accumulation and tabulation of facts (e.g., through censuses, tax returns, and crime figures) transforms reality and the qualitative world into a calculable form (i.e., what Ian Hacking calls "the taming of chance"), and thus makes it susceptible to evaluation and intervention. 70 The emergence of indicators as techniques of governance is part of the broader prevalence of economic expertise within the world of bureaucracies as well as in domestic and international public policymaking. Economic knowledge has diffused across national bureaucracies in many countries throughout the twentieth century. 71 Marion Fourcade argues that "[e]conomics has become central to the nation . . . because the nation has become more economic." 72 The globalization of economics and the economic profession is related to the global circulation of capital (e.g., through public aid and foreign direct investment) and the resulting economic interdependence of nations. 73 The globalization of the law has also created opportunities for economists to enter legal arenas worldwide. 74 power," including a global diffusion of the neoclassical paradigm for economies, independent of local or historical context. 75 Economists, statisticians, and accountants are playing a central role in the data collection and information processing required for developing and applying indicators. They decide what should be counted, the methods of collecting data, and how that data should then be interpreted and aggregated. When indicators are used as a regulatory tool and become incorporated into law, these experts exert a significant influence over political decision making, as I will demonstrate in the case of the GRI.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE AS THE LEADING STANDARD FOR CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
The field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a fertile area for the use of indicators. Scholars have argued that companies have legal obligations under international law, particularly for violations of human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection. 76 A variety of initiatives have aimed to hold multinational companies accountable under domestic or international law but they have remained largely ineffective. The extraterritorial operations of companies are largely unregulated through domestic law, with the exception of litigation under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act, whose extraterritorial application to corporations was recently curtailed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 77 International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations, such as the UN, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the ISO, have drafted standards and principles addressed to companies (e.g., the UN Global Compact and ISO 26000) and governments (e.g., the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy). 78 84 Its guidelines have become the global standard for corporate sustainability reporting. They currently consist of standard disclosures (e.g., organizational profile, stakeholder engagement, and report parameters), reporting principles (e.g., materiality, stakeholder inclusiveness, and accuracy), and, most notably, a set of seventy-nine indicators (sub-divided into fifty core indicators and twenty-nine additional indicators). 85 Many indicators incorporate legal standards on such issues as corporate governance, human rights, anti-discrimination, labor, corruption, and the environment; they also reference a variety of international agreements, including ILO conventions, OECD Guidelines, and U.N. international human rights conventions. 86 The indicators attempt to convert legal norms into quantifiable metrics that are easily compared across corporations and serve as a benchmark for improving performance. While the GRI framework is a voluntary self-regulatory initiative developed by a private, network-based organization, it is moving into the realm of hard law through incorporation into mandatory regulations. 87 The GRI has influenced state governments and stock exchanges to adopt binding and non-binding corporate disclosure standards based on its guidelines. According to a recent study using data from fifty-eight countries, mandatory disclosure of sustainability information has significant consequences on socially responsible managerial practices. 88 This research suggests that regulation based on GRI indicators has the potential to improve corporate behavior. GRI receives funds from foundations, governments, and corporate sponsors, and also generates income by directly providing services to GRI users (e.g., training programs, executive seminars, and software tools). 91 It aims to empower civil society organizations to seek greater accountability for corporate governance. 92 Following a model of information regulation, a GRI report would presumably "mobiliz[e] its recipients to demand certain performance levels and enabl[e] activists and NGOs to reward practices considered socially responsible and exert pressure on poor performers." 93 The GRI seeks to raise sustainability reporting to the same status as financial reporting by developing metrics for companies to disclose on intangible assets such as human rights and environmental performance. 94 By presenting this information in a comparable and consistent format through quantifiable measures, the GRI attempts to signal that these intangibles have market value and can affect the financial health of a company.
A. Overview of the GRI
The GRI bases its legitimacy on a multi-stakeholder consultation process among intergovernmental organizations, businesses, NGOs, and labor unions. 95 It is comprised of four permanent bodies: the Board of Directors, the Secretariat based in Amsterdam (employing more than fifty people), the Technical Advisory Committee, and the Stakeholder Council. 96 The Technical Advisory Committee is responsible for the development and revision of the reporting framework, while the Stakeholder Council deliberates on key strategic and policy issues, and appoints the Board of Directors. 97 The Stakeholder Council's sixty members are geographically representative and include twenty-two seats for business, sixteen seats for NGOs, six seats for labor, and sixteen seats for so-called "mediating institutions" (which include accounting and consulting firms, foundations, and governments). 98 accounting firms, with relatively few NGOs and organized labor associations. 99 The GRI has formed alliances with a variety of institutional partners and promotes convergence around other corporate social responsibility guidelines and principles. 100 The most notable is between the GRI and the UN Global Compact, which was announced in October 2006. 101 As part of this alliance, the GRI's guidelines incorporate the Global Compact's requirements for signatory companies that annually report a Communication on Progress. 102 The GRI and the Global Compact have also published a draft tool to guide companies in linking the two reporting processes. 103 The GRI has formed linkages with other standards, including the International Finance Corporation's sustainability performance standards, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), ISO 26000, and the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 104 These alliances serve to deflect competition from similar initiatives such as the CDP, whose climate change reporting framework is used by over 3,000 companies around the world. 105 The GRI guidelines are voluntary and incremental, and include a high level of flexibility, allowing companies to decide which principles and indicators to adopt. 106 They are designed to improve over time to reflect lessons learned and the changing expectations of companies and stakeholders. The first Sustainability Reporting Guidelines were established 99. Levy 105. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). The GRI is distinct from the CDP because it addresses broader elements of sustainability reporting covering social and governance issues in addition to environmental issues. Yet there is considerable overlap between the GRI's environmental indicators and the CDP's questions on energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.
106. Indicator protocols are available to guide organizations as to how to define the relevant terms, compile data, and find potential information sources. In addition, the GRI has produced a variety of sector supplements (e.g., on financial services, electric utilities, and the mining sector) that provide additional guidance and appropriate indicators for companies in that industry. 107 The G3 guidelines were the product of a two-year development process which involved about 3,000 stakeholders worldwide and provided public comment opportunities. 108 Among the revisions from G2 to G3 are the elaboration of methods for calculating indicators, the requirement of disclosure of an organization's management approach, and broad applicability of the guidelines to private and public actors, including small and large companies, NGOs, and public agencies. The GRI has recently completed updates in the areas of human rights, gender, community impacts, and materiality, which resulted in its G3.1 guidelines (released in March 2011). 109 Finally, in October 2010, the GRI announced that it will begin developing the fourth generation of its guidelines (G4), which are scheduled to be released in 2013. 110 The general aim behind G4 is to increase the robustness of the guidelines in order to further mainstream sustainability reporting and eventually combine it with financial reporting as part of one "integrated report." 111 In accordance with the quantity (but not quality) of disclosure, companies self-declare their score as A, B, or C, which the GRI refers to as its "application level." 112 Companies at level C have reported on a minimum of ten GRI indicators, including at least one from each of the environmental, social, and economic categories. Level B means that companies have disclosed their management approach (e.g., their goals, monitoring, and relevant policies) and reported on at least twenty indicators, with at least one from each of the environmental and economic categories as well as one from each of the social sub-categories of human rights, labor, society, and product responsibility. Level A means that companies have disclosed their management approach and reported on all fifty core indicators, or alternatively, explained the reason why certain indicators were omitted (such as a lack of materiality for the company part of this process, companies undergo a materiality test to determine which issues to report on based on such factors as what is important to stakeholders, the existence of relevant laws and regulations, and whether the issue may pose a significant risk. Level A companies must also report on indicators in its sector supplement, if one is available. Finally, companies have the option of adding a "+" to their level (e.g., an A+) if a third-party assurance provider has verified its data. Therefore, if no "+" is present, there has been no external verification of the information in a company's GRI report. 113 While companies could choose from over thirty different reporting frameworks in the 1990s, the GRI has now become "the de facto international reporting standard." 114 According to a 2008 study by the accounting firm KPMG, more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune 250 companies and nearly seventy percent of the 100 largest companies by revenue use GRI guidelines as the basis for their reporting. 115 As of 2013, there were at least 5,470 organizations reporting in eighty-one countries, based on those that submitted their reports to the GRI. 116 What is the motivation for companies to use GRI?
In jurisdictions where there is no mandatory regulation to report on sustainability, there are a variety of reasons why companies nevertheless choose to do so -e.g., gaining competitive advantage through "improved management of ESG [(environmental, social, and governance)] impacts and overall risk, enhancement of company reputation, and a greater ability to attract and retain both customers and talent." 117 As part of a strategic approach, companies use the GRI guidelines to develop internal metrics that track their social and environmental performance, identify potential risks, and integrate sustainability goals with their overall business objectives. In addition, companies may feel pressure to report because their industry peers are doing so, or in order to deflect civil society pressure after a prominent environmental or human rights incident. In this case, reporting may be part of a public relations exercise and not reflect any real desire to enhance performance.
There have been a number of critiques of the GRI, both by NGOs and companies themselves. NGOs have criticized the GRI for its division of indicators into core indicators and additional ones that are optional and up to the discretion of companies to include, even if they may be important to 113 
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REGULATING THROUGH NUMBERS 597 certain stakeholders. Civil society groups have also questioned the credibility of third-party verification services (usually performed by private accounting and consulting firms), given that there are no uniform guidelines to ensure their reliability. 118 At the same time, companies have complained that they are on a "reporting treadmill," where they spend so much time gathering data that they are left with few resources to implement changes in the organization. 119 Finally, there is a general concern that the GRI ranks reports based on the level of disclosure (e.g., the number of indicators that companies report on) rather than the quality and accuracy of a firm's sustainability performance. 120 I will expand upon these critiques in Part III in my discussion of the unintended consequences of using indicators like the GRI.
B. The GRI's Impact on Domestic Regulation and Financial Markets
The GRI has moved into the realm of hard law by shaping regulation by regional organizations, states, and stock exchanges. It has recently begun promoting mandatory government regulation on sustainability reporting as well as integrated reporting within the global financial framework, as evidenced by a recent session on the topic at the 2011 World Economic Forum. 121 The primary motivation behind the GRI's lobbying efforts is that the majority of companies are still not reporting on sustainability. About 4,000 companies are currently issuing CSR reports, which represents a ten-fold increase since the mid-1990s. 122 Just over one-third of those reporters (about 1,400 companies) used the GRI guidelines in 2009. 123 As previously mentioned, three-quarters of the Global Fortune 250 companies use the GRI. 124 That means that many small and mediumsized companies are still not using the GRI, or issuing sustainability reports at all. In an effort to increase participation, the GRI has recently begun encouraging regulation in the disclosure of environmental and social issues.
The GRI's promotion of regulation represents a significant shift in its role and mission, from an independent organization that encourages companies to voluntarily report on sustainability to a more advocacy- 
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European countries, in particular, are at the forefront of mandatory reporting regulations. France was one of the earliest countries to mandate ESG disclosure. Its 2001 New Economic Regulation requires all listed companies to report on forty social and environmental criteria in their annual reports. 131 The Swedish government requires state-owned enterprises to issue sustainability reports in accordance with GRI's G3 guidelines and subject to external assurance. 132 Spain similarly enacted legislation that requires state-owned companies and businesses with over 1,000 employees to produce sustainability reports beginning in 2012. 133 As of 2009, Denmark requires disclosure of CSR activities in financial statements by both state-owned companies and companies with total assets of more than 19 million euros, revenues more than 38 million euros, and more than 250 employees -totaling about 1,100 companies. 134 In addition, Denmark's mandate extends to institutional investors, investment associations, and other listed financial businesses. 135 The guidance notes to Denmark's amended Financial Statements Act encourages the use of GRI guidelines to fulfill the reporting requirement. 136 The other EU countries have adopted similar legislation to implement the EU Modernisation Directive on corporate disclosure of non-financial information. Existing EU law mandates private companies to include nonfinancial key performance indicators in their annual reports "where appropriate" and "[t]o the extent necessary for an understanding of the company's development, performance or position." 137 The European Commission is considering improvements to this policy because the requirements for disclosure (including indicators) are unclear and EU member states can choose to exempt small and medium-sized enterprises. 138 In addition to mandatory regulations, governments are issuing voluntary guidelines on sustainability reporting for companies and public agencies, many of which cite the GRI guidelines. For instance, Australia's Department of Economics and Heritage issued a guide to reporting using GRI-consistent environmental indicators, and its Minerals Council (an industry group) recommends public sustainability reporting under GRI's Mining and Metals Sector Supplement. 141 The Canadian government has also endorsed the GRI for CSR reporting by the extractive sector. 142 In 2007, Japan released its Environmental Reporting Guidelines, which cite GRI guidelines and require environmental reporting for specified corporations. 143 Stock exchanges are another important driving force behind sustainability reporting. They are encouraging companies to be transparent as to their sustainability performance and, in some cases, mandating disclosure. Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange must disclose in their annual reports any non-financial information relevant to their business, although they do not have to file a full-length CSR report. 144 In Australia, companies listed on its national exchange must disclose the extent to which they have followed the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, which include sustainability issues. 145 Emerging market countries are also promoting voluntary standards in CSR reporting through the involvement of local stock exchanges. the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are required to follow the King Report on Corporate Governance, which mandates integrated reporting that incorporates financial and non-financial information. 146 China's Shanghai Stock Exchange encourages companies to file annual CSR reports and develop a CSR strategy, and provides incentives for doing so, such as priority election into the prestigious Shanghai Corporate Governance Sector. 147 The Bovespa Stock Exchange in Brazil has played an influential role in raising ESG standards among companies as part of an active national movement for more sustainable investment. 148 Many exchanges have also created socially responsible investing indices. 149 The motivation for this activity includes demand from investors for sustainability-related information and the development of specialized markets for sustainable investment niches, particularly in emerging market countries. 150 Interest in sustainability issues is not restricted to socially responsible investors. In fact, there are more than 1100 asset owners, investment managers, and service providers with $32 trillion in assets that are signatories to the UN's Principles for Responsible Investment, which promotes incorporation of ESG issues in investment analysis and decision making and disclosure of those issues in annual financial reports. 151 This brings us to the United States. U.S.-based companies have lagged in participation in the GRI, although there has been a significant increase in recent years. 152 The SEC has been at the center of regulatory efforts to mandate corporate sustainability reporting. Over the past decade, advocacy and investor groups (including some of the largest U.S. pension funds) have successfully engaged with and formally petitioned the SEC to issue guidance on existing rules, increase shareholder rights, and develop new disclosure requirements. On October 27, 2009, the SEC reversed an existing policy (under Rule 14A-8(I)(7)) that had allowed companies to exclude shareholder resolutions requesting information on financial risks 146 153 In January 2010, the agency released an interpretive guidance note on the disclosure of climate change risks in financial filings. 154 The note cited the GRI as a model for sustainability reporting in its 2010 guidance note regarding disclosure related to climate change. 155 The premise behind the interpretation is that a company's 10-K annual report should include discussion of material risks, which may include climate change and other sustainability-related risks. Notably, the guidance note cited the GRI as a model framework for sustainability reporting.
There is current pressure on the SEC to require companies to assess and disclose on not only climate-related risks but also other material environmental, social, and governance risks. A petition to former SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro by an association of investment professionals proposed that the agency "require issuers to report annually on a comprehensive, uniform set of sustainability indicators . . . and that the SEC define this as the highest level of the current version of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting guidelines." 156 Consistent with that request, the SEC's Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) took an initial step towards considering ESG disclosure. The IAC was created by Chairwoman Schapiro in 2009 to give greater voice to investors and was regularly attended by several Commissioners as well as senior SEC officials. 157 The Committee was recently codified as a permanent institution under the Dodd-Frank Act and will soon be reconstituted with members appointed by the entire Commission. 158 Among the IAC's priorities was ESG disclosure, which was studied by the Investor as Owner Subcommittee. On May 18, 2010, the subcommittee met with a panel of experts on ESG issues, including the GRI's Director of Sustainability Reporting. 159 Before being temporarily disbanded in light of the Dodd-Frank Act, the subcommittee's final resolution reflects a recognition that ESG disclosure is a priority that should be addressed by the SEC:
The Investor as Owner Subcommittee of the Investor Advisory Committee believes that the SEC should develop dedicated internal resources to monitor and advise on developments regarding the disclosure of corporate social and environmental performance data. Activities could include:  Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of current US disclosure requirements and enforcement measures;  Monitoring global developments and participating in appropriate fora;  Serving as a point of contact for investors, issuers and other stakeholders on these issues; and  Making recommendations to the Commission where appropriate. The Investor as Owner Subcommittee of the Investor Advisory Committee further believes that periodic public reports on these activities be produced. 160 The above resolution is not binding on the SEC, and it remains to be seen how much weight will be accorded to it by the yet-to-be constituted new IAC.
There are a variety of obstacles that may prevent the SEC releasing additional guidance or requirements for ESG disclosure. The agency currently does not have the requisite expertise and capacity to make meaningful decisions on the costs and benefits of mandating environmental and social reporting. SEC officials perceive that there is insufficient interest among mainstream investors, as opposed to socially responsible investors. 161 Moreover, while ESG disclosure remains on the SEC's long-term agenda, it has become less of a short-term priority given the resources needed to implement the Dodd-Frank Act. 162 The Dodd-Frank Act includes three provisions that are particularly relevant to ESG reporting, which suggests the incremental fashion by which sustainability reporting is being mandated in the United States. Section 1502 imposes a new reporting requirement on publicly traded companies that manufacture products using certain conflict minerals. 163 For example, companies must identify whether the sourcing of the . If so, they must submit an independent private sector audit report on due diligence measures taken to avoid using minerals that directly or indirectly finance armed groups in the DRC. 164 Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes new disclosure requirements on mine safety. 165 Mining companies must disclose in their annual and quarterly reports to the SEC on the safety and health requirements that apply to mines under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 166 Finally, section 1504 requires natural resources companies to disclose certain payments made to governments for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. 167 Outside of the SEC, there are notable efforts by federal agencies to incorporate GRI reporting. Under an executive order signed in January 2010 entitled "Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance," all federal agencies are required to issue a strategic sustainability performance plan. 168 In addition to developing a plan that includes quantifiable metrics and sustainability goals, agencies must also inventory their greenhouse gas emissions and set targets to reduce their emissions by 2020. 169 Each agency must also appoint a senior sustainability officer, and the Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) will report agency results to the President. 170 Since the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Postal Service already issue GRI-based reports, GRI representatives are lobbying the CEQ to recommend that all agencies issue their strategic sustainability performance plans under a GRI model. 171 Efforts to regulate sustainability reporting in the United States are still slow compared to efforts in other countries. In order to raise its U.S. profile, the GRI officially launched a focal point office in New York City on January 31, 2011. 172 The opening ceremony took place at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with a panel discussion on "Why is America Letting the World Lead in Sustainability Reporting?" This event was a clear effort to engage financial leaders and information providers who could then motivate U.S. companies to report on sustainability using the GRI. Among the participants at the event were Bloomberg and NYSE Euronext, the leading global operators of financial markets and providers of trading technologies. 173 An essential component of the GRI's strategy in the United States is garnering and publicizing support of the initiative among market data providers. A significant development in this direction came in late 2009 when Bloomberg began providing 120 ESG variables for public companies on its 250,000 data terminals. 174 Users now have access to this data at no additional cost and can manipulate it in the same way as traditional financial metrics. By adding ESG data, Bloomberg recognizes that mainstream institutional investors, not just socially responsible investors, will increasingly consider sustainability performance in their investment decisions. In presentations to business associations and industry groups (including the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the National Investor Relations Institute), the GRI highlights how Bloomberg and other information providers, such as Thomson Reuters, NASDAQ, RiskMetrics, and KLD Research & Analytics, rely on GRI reports when compiling ESG data. 175 According to a Bloomberg representative, "to make our content relevant to the marketplace, we needed to display the information exactly in the format provided by GRI, as this has become the market standard." 176 For instance, when a Bloomberg user selects a company's water consumption variable, she is immediately linked to the company's GRI report. If the company has not issued a report, then the cell will remain blank. The GRI hopes that companies will therefore feel pressure from investors to disclose their social and environmental data and, over time, improve their performance. 177 Rating agencies and sustainability indices are other potential avenues to pressure companies to report using the GRI. Many rating agencies build their methodologies around GRI indicators although they are not necessarily public about it. 178 One index that explicitly relies on GRI metrics is NASDAQ's Global Sustainability 50 Index. 179 In the fall of 2009, the index removed twenty-three firms, including Cisco, Microsoft, and Oracle, for failing to disclose on a minimum of forty percent of core GRI indicators. 180 While indices and rating agencies track reporting based on the indicators, however, they do not track performance or improvement over time.
III. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF USING INDICATORS IN GOVERNANCE
Indicators are not neutral instruments that can be applied mechanically. They are normative tools that embed certain values and shape behavior according to a standard. 181 They also carry potential costs. Whether indicators play a beneficial or harmful role in turn can influence the perceived legitimacy of the government agencies and private actors that produce and rely on them. 182 Whether civil society perceives an actor as legitimate will affect the agency's right to govern, its claim to authority, and the likelihood of compliance with its directives. 183 Based on personal interviews with GRI staff in Amsterdam and New York City, and observations at a GRI-certified training session, I will identify potential costs associated with using indicators, which challenge their effectiveness in meaningfully comparing units of analysis and evaluating performance.
A. The Promotion of Box Ticking and Superficial Compliance
The use of indicators risks producing a box ticking approach to compliance, which entails superficial or cosmetic changes without any substantive effects on behavior. Box ticking refers to a "rigid, mechanical practice involving the use of needlessly detailed 'standardized checklists' and pursued without regard to weighing costs against benefits." 184 The scientific authority of indicators and their focus on transparency can conceal behavioral changes (or the lack thereof) and lead to data gathering for its own sake, with a preference for precise but not necessarily relevant data. 185 As a result, indicators run the risk of promoting business interests at the expense of public interests, thus drawing regulation away from its primary purpose and not measuring what is important. 186 Organizations that produce indicators may become more preoccupied with perpetuating their existence and raising their status, rather than using the indicators as a tool to shape behavior. In this way, the process of producing more and better indicators becomes an end in itself.
When indicators are used in regulatory governance, there can be a slippage between their initial goals and intended audience, and the goals and audience that evolve over time. For instance, the GRI training session that I attended was exclusively focused on revising indicators and disclosing more information, rather than promoting its original aim of corporate accountability. When the GRI was founded, the intended audience for its reports was communities, consumers, non-governmental organizations, and shareholders who would presumably read the reports, encourage companies to improve their performance on sustainability issues, and thereby shift the balance of power in corporate governance. 187 However, the focus of the GRI's activities has now become the users (the companies) -the GRI devotes significant resources to developing learning tools, training courses, and services for report preparers and users. 188 A GRI official that I interviewed admitted that the GRI's main audience is companies and that its primary motivation is to increase company participation. 189 Here we see a gap between the GRI's stated goal of multi-stakeholder consensus-building and its actual operations.
The GRI is no longer aimed at empowering its original audience to hold corporations accountable. For instance, it is questionable who actually reads the reports. According to one study, "there is widespread agreement that the [GRI] reports are not studied in any detail." 190 193 NGOs also do not trust the data, which usually is not verified by a third party. They only pay attention to whether a company releases a report but not its actual content. What becomes important then is simply the procedural exercise of filling out a report or, in other words, superficial compliance. The GRI's application levels further reinforce its focus on transparency for its own sake rather than actual improvements in behavior. Recall that the GRI attaches an application level to a report largely based on the number of indicators that a company reports on. 194 A company receives an "A" if it reports on at least fifty indicators, a "B" for twenty, and a "C" for ten. 195 That means that a company that is destroying the environment could nevertheless get an "A" for reporting on fifty or more indicators (as well as disclosing its management approach). Thus, the application levels are based on the level of disclosure, rather than the quality and accuracy of a firm's actual performance. One GRI official admitted that there is a general misconception that the application levels serve as a ranking based on quality of performance, rather than an objective classification of the level of transparency:
What we've seen is that it's . . . a challenge on the communication side. So often the levels have been presented as being a grade or a quality mark or a performance related statement, which has been quite difficult for us to counteract. I mean, whenever we came across something like that we would contact the company and then ask them to change the statement, but of course, since we're an international organization you can never ensure that you find everything . . . . That's also inherent in the system [of] "A," "B," and "C" in a U. 
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performance rather than moving up levels for its own sake. 197 Moreover, external verification is only optional, and a company could add a "+" to its application level even if only a small portion of its report has been externally verified. 198 Third-party verifiers like accounting firms do not have to comply with a uniform assurance standard. 199 Here we see that the motivation behind the producers of the GRI is not that the reports are actually read by NGOs or whether they reflect a company's good or bad performance, but that more and more companies participate and release reports. As the GRI enhances its profile and perpetuates its status as the market leader in sustainability reporting, it may be undermining its legitimacy and the purported goals behind its indicators.
B. The Dominance of Technical Experts over Decision Making
Because indicators rely on numerically-rendered data, technical experts (both within government agencies and private actors) exercise considerable power over decision making and the interpretation of legal norms. While their specialized knowledge and political neutrality can be a benefit for policy making, 200 it is difficult for stakeholders to challenge the power of experts and their methodology and assumptions in producing the indicators. Since indicators carry scientific authority, they mask potential conflicts of interest among technical experts and leave little room for contestation. This is the case for the GRI, where accounting firms are heavily involved in both indicator production and data verification.
Providing assurance for sustainability reports has become a growing business, especially for accounting companies that have been seeking credibility following the Enron scandal. 201 As a result, "[a] large service industry comprised largely of sustainability consultancies and auditing firms has emerged around the revisions of the guidelines, preparations of reports, their verification, stakeholder outreach, and various efforts to standardize and institutionalize the above activities." 202 that specifically focus on corporate sustainability measurement and reporting. 203 The role of accounting firms as independent third-parties is dubious given that they are actively governing the same organization that they are presumably regulating. Representatives from large accounting firms occupy key positions in the GRI's governance structure, including the Board of Directors, from which they advise on the methodology and interpretation of indicators. 204 In an informational brochure about its sustainability practice, Deloitte advertises that it:
has been involved in every stage of the GRI's growth and development . . . . Deloitte member firms were involved in the 2002 revision of the GRI guidelines, as well as the 2006 revision at which the current G3 guidelines were drafted. Many Deloitte member firm professionals have played key roles in the GRI governance and stakeholder bodies . . . . Moreover, Deloitte member firm teams both advise clients on reporting and assurance according to GRI guidelines and collaborate . . . on GRI-sponsored training. 205 The big four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) have also recently sponsored the GRI's new U.S. office for the first two years. 206 Yet these same firms also have a stake in increasing the market for their services. Given that the firms may provide other services to their clients, such as financial auditing, they have an interest in trying to package their financial and non-financial services together. More companies using GRI and seeking external assurance represents a significant revenue opportunity for the big accounting firms.
Given the proliferation of performance codes, standards, and other forms of voluntary self-regulation, the "third-party assurance industry" is becoming increasingly influential in the interpretation of legal norms in a variety of areas. 207 Accountants are thus exercising authority over how legal norms are valued, interpreted, measured, and verified. 208 Given their conflict of interest, sensitive issues may be left out by assurance providers for fear of upsetting their clients. 209 In the case of the GRI where the verification of data often involves law-related issues such as the application of international human rights and environmental standards, accountants arguably lack the professional competence to conduct a proper evaluation. 210 Surprisingly, there are no legal experts on the GRI's Technical Advisory Committee, so their participation in the production of GRI guidelines and the interpretation of indicators is limited to consultations with Organizational Stakeholders. 211
C. The Distortion of Public Values into Numbers
When indicators do not accurately represent the social phenomena that they are intended to evaluate, they lose their effectiveness as regulatory tools. This risk particularly applies to the use of indicators to measure public values that are non-instrumental and difficult to translate into numbers. Legal norms may then be interpreted in a managerial way that distorts their original meaning. 212 In the case of the GRI, issues that are easy to quantify, such as greenhouse gas emissions, are prioritized. At the same time, issues such as human rights and community impact are subordinated or even diluted as they are translated into mere business risks. In this way, indicators may lead to better performance on certain issues by relying on the power of numbers, but may neglect those issues that are difficult to quantify. So instead of the maxim "what is measured gets done," in fact in reality, what is easy to measure may be the only thing that gets done.
While quantification may be appropriate for many environmental or health and safety issues, it is difficult to capture other material information in measurable quantities. For instance, critics argue that the subjection of certain issues to cost-benefit analysis (as it is currently structured) may strip them of their intrinsic value. 213 As the GRI develops its fourth well it contributes to understanding in combination with the other required disclosures. 218 In other words, public values such as human rights cannot be captured by numbers alone. Despite the working group's report, the GRI is moving in the direction of more quantification and the translation of all issues into potential financial risks.
As part of its efforts to streamline indicators and mainstream reporting, the GRI recently announced a goal that by 2020, all companies will adopt an integrated report. 219 This means that a company would release a single annual report that includes indicators for both financial and non-financial information. 220 The purpose of an integrated report is to raise the status of non-financial information and demonstrate its relationship to a company's core business strategy. Yet if integrated reporting one day became the norm and ultimately replaced sustainability reports, then the standard for including environmental and social issues would be financial materialitythat is, the same standard used for financial statements under the SEC based on what a reasonable investor would consider important in making an investment decision. 221 Therefore, issues like human rights, which are materially important for communities and NGOs but may not necessarily be financially material, may be left out of an integrated report. 222 The GRI's progression towards integrated reporting represents an effort to translate public values into financial terms and transform them into business risks. In the case of human rights, what is developing is a risk management approach that defines potential violations as strategic risks, which may damage a company's reputation, threaten its profits, and lead to possible litigation. 223 invokes their universal character, symbolic valence, and emancipatory power). 225 As a result, human rights indicators that rely exclusively on quantitative measurement may distort the legal norms on which they are based and challenge the usefulness of these tools to effectively evaluate performance.
IV. HOW TO ENHANCE THE PROMISE AND MINIMIZE THE PERILS OF INDICATORS
Given the potential costs of using indicators in legal governance, how can we enhance their effectiveness as regulatory instruments? I argue that indicators are useful tools that provide important benefits to the policymaking process. But they are not ends in themselves. Their ultimate goal should be improving performance and changing long-term behavior. Towards that end, I draw upon my case study of the GRI to propose the following recommendations. These prescriptions apply to both regulatory actors such as government agencies that incorporate indicators into decision making, as well as private actors such as the GRI that produce indicators and shape regulation.
A. Design Meaningful Indicators and Rankings
In order to avoid box ticking and superficial compliance, regulators should design meaningful indicators that measure information that is relevant to stakeholders, can be reasonably collected, and addresses issues on which change is most needed. A meaningful indicator would be one where an improvement in the number implies that things actually got better on the ground. Towards that end, it is important to balance structure-based and process-based indicators with outcome-based indicators. 226 Structure-based indicators focus on the legal and institutional framework and organizational inputs, such as the adoption of a policy or equipment type. Process-based indicators measure the efforts made to meet obligations and achieve performance outcomes, such as levels of spending on female primary education or the percentage of employees trained in an organization's anti-corruption policies. Outcome-oriented indicators measure how well one's initiatives are accomplishing the intended results, such as total greenhouse gas emissions or an increase in 
B. Avoid Data Overload
When identifying meaningful indicators, one must be careful of data overload as a result of having too many indicators. Having more data does not necessarily mean facilitating better decision-making. As I observed with the GRI, there is a tendency to think that technology is the answer. Alan Knight, the Associate Senior Partner of AccountAbility (a global non-profit organization that provides advisory services and creates standards on sustainability) expressed his concern over the reliance on technology to produce effective corporate reporting: "Technology is very good with data. But data must be debated, analyzed, and considered. Technology can help this process of analysis and consideration but should not be relied on to provide ready-made answers. Technology is only a tool. The buck can never stop at a tool." 233 Simply focusing on information disclosure through indicators may actually be counterproductive because it may appear as greenwashing. The ultimate goal should be embedding certain norms into company culture. Telefónica, S.A., a Spanish company that has effectively used the GRI indicators towards changing behavior states:
CR [(Corporate responsibility)] reports provide a management platform similar to an iceberg structure. On top, we have indicators as the piece of information that is visible in the report. Second, we have systems and processes implemented in the company, not visible to stakeholders, that help to produce and collect all information within the company. And finally, we verify both indicators and processes to make sure CR issues are implemented properly. So finally, CR reports are a driver to speed up the CSR implementation within the company. 234 Indicators are just the tip of the iceberg that includes a larger strategy for change. The GRI's focus on disclosing more and more information (resulting in as many as seventy-nine performance indicators) has led to a deviation from its goals. The large number of indicators discourages companies from adopting the GRI, especially U.S. companies whose corporate counsel fear the litigation risk attached to too much disclosure. On the part of investors and government officials in the SEC, there is a concern that GRI reports are not sufficiently streamlined and not focused on performance outcomes. 235 Some regulatory bodies argue that before mandating any kind of corporate sustainability reporting, they first need a much smaller set of key performance indicators that are clearly linked with financial materiality. 236 What is currently under debate is which key performance indicators are the most appropriate for each industry. 237 
C. Require Third-Party Verification
Indicators are not meaningful if there is little confidence in the information that they provide. It must be costly for actors to disclose false information, which they are arguably more prone to doing under selfmonitoring systems. In order to ensure the quality and reliability of the data that feeds into indicators, regulatory agencies should require verification by an independent third party. Possible third parties include NGOs or auditing firms, as long as they are not directly involved in the production or governance of the indicators.
The lack of a third-party assurance requirement affects the trustworthiness of GRI reporting, as viewed by investors and NGOs. Third-party assurance (where a firm will certify whether a company conforms to a relevant standard) is currently optional under the G3 guidelines, and there is not a uniform auditing standard that the GRI requires when an audit is carried out. 238 Due to the possibility that companies may be tempted to misrepresent data so as to enhance their public reputation, the public and NGOs frequently do not trust the litigation concern involves a company disclosing "material" information in a voluntary sustainability report that has not been included in a regulatory filing under federal securities law. 254 Since corporate counsel are usually the ones to decide whether a company will participate in the GRI, lawyers should be more involved in the GRI in order to appropriately design the indicators and promote the guidelines to companies. Moreover, assurance providers should include a broad group of experts in their teams of verifiers, including not only lawyers but also environmental scientists and anthropologists with knowledge of the local cultural context. 255 
CONCLUSION
What are the unintended consequences of using metrics in decision making? Are indicators measuring what is critical towards changing behavior? How can we more effectively use these tools to minimize their costs and enhance their benefits?
In this Article, I have sought to answer these questions by drawing on an empirical study of the Global Reporting Initiative. I demonstrate that indicators do not just serve as instruments to regulate behavior; they themselves have normative authority and may be fraught with problems. Indicators are playing an important role in governance given their ability to simplify and translate social phenomena into a numerical representation that is easy to understand and comparable across actors. They have become particularly prevalent in international law as a mechanism to increase compliance and operationalize global norms. Yet as indicators hide behind a veil of scientific truth and neutrality, they mask potential problems: the promotion of box-ticking and superficial compliance; the dominance of technical experts over decision making; and the distortion of public values into numbers.
Like all tools, indicators can be misused and manipulated in a way that strays from their purported goals and intended audiences. Their costs threaten to outweigh their benefits if they are not designed meaningfully and if there is little confidence in the information that they provide. Therefore, regulatory bodies should not treat indicators as ends in and of themselves, but rather as a means towards evaluating performance and ultimately improving behavior. 
